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MEDICAL DECISIONMAKING FOR
INCOMPETENT PERSONS: THE
MASSACHUSETTS SUBSTITUTED
JUDGMENT MODEL
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INTRODUCTION

In his book, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, I Professor
Jay Katz describes the apparently ingrained belief of physicians that
patients are unequal partners in the medical decisionmaking process.
Professor Katz contends that this insistence on authority has stifled
any serious exploration of whether doctors and patients can interact
with one another on the basis of greater equality. "Thus the idea of
informed consent-of mutual decisionmaking-remains severely com
promised" (p. 87).
A related context is that of medical decisionmaking for incompe
tent persons. In the next few pages, the authors will explore this area
in terms of Massachusetts law, focusing particularly on extraordinary
treatment situations. We believe that physicians' insistence on author
ity creates additional and unnecessary obstacles to meeting the legiti
mate treatment needs of incompetent patients. This traditional
attitude on the part of the medical community, coupled with the con
tinuing confusion on the part of both doctors and lawyers regarding
the substituted judgment doctrine, poses the risk of seriously compro
mising the civil rights of incompetent persons.
Judges, in making substituted judgments for incompetent per
sons, are in an analogous position to that of competent patients in
relation to their physicians. The judge's duty is to discover and imple
ment the incompetent person's own values and preferences and not to
• Presiding Justice of the Hampshire Division of the Probate and Family Court
Department; B.B.S., Fairfield University, 1962; J.D., Boston University School of Law,
1965.
•• First Assistant Register of the Hampshire Division of the Probate and Family
Court Department; Member of the Massachusetts Mental Health Legal Advisors' Com
mittee; A.B., Cornell University, 1971; J.D., Boston University School of Law, 1974.
I. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (\984).
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defer to physician authority as a conditioned response. Judges, like
patients, can benefit from Professor Katz's model of effective, respect
ful conversation, albeit within the confines of a formal judicial
proceeding.
I.
A.

THE SAIKEWICZ DECISION

Significance of the Decision
In 1977, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued its

landmark decision regarding potentially life-prolonging medical treat
ment for an incompetent person~uperintendent ofBelchertown State
School v. Saikewicz. 2 Factually, the case involved the question of
whether chemotherapy should be administered to a mentally retarded
person who suffered from leukemia and who was incapable, due to his
profound mental retardation, of making a medical treatment decision.
The Saikewicz opinion rejected the idea that such decisionmaking
responsibility should be delegated either to doctors or family members
or guardians. 3 Instead, the supreme judicial court held that the trial
court should make a so-called "substituted judgment" determination
by substituting itself for the ward and attempting to ascertain his ac
tual interests and preferences. 4 In essence, the supreme judicial court
fashioned a judicial decisionmaking model to be applied in cases in
volving the question of whether life-prolonging treatment should be
administered to incompetent persons.
The reaction of the medical community to Saikewicz was ex
tremely negative. As one physician wrote, "[t]his astonishing opinion
can only be viewed as a resounding vote of 'no confidence' in the abil
ity of physicians and families to act in the best interests of the incapa
ble patient suffering from a terminal illness."5
The supreme judicial court, however, did not view its decision as
a "gratuitous encroachment on the domain ofphysicians."6 From the
authors' perspective, too much of the discussion of this judicial deci
sionmaking model has been couched' in terms of lawyers or judges
usurping the traditional role of physicians. Such narrow perspective
misses the important considerations which underlie the Saikewicz
opinion and the decisions following Saikewicz which have extended
2. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
3. Id. at 758, 370 N.E.2d at 434.
4. Id. at 752, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
5. ReIman, The Saikewicz Decision: Judges as Physicians, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED.
508, 509 (1978).
6. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435.
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the substituted judgment doctrine to other areas of medical care and
treatment. A review of the basic tenets of these decisions underscores
the important but different roles of the court, the medical community,
and other players in extraordinary medical treatment cases.
B.

Judicial Analysis and Reasoning

According to Saikewicz, one of the underlying principles of the
substituted judgment doctrine is the constitutional right of an individ
ual to privacy, a guaranty which encompasses the choice to accept or
to refuse medical treatment. 7 This fundamental right extends "not
only to competent patients but also to incompetent persons because
the value of human dignity extends to both."8
It is important to note that a substituted judgment determination
cannot be made until there is a judicial determination of incompetency
by reason of an individual's minority,9 mental illness,1O or mental re
tardation. II A person is presumed to be capable of handling his or her
affairs unless shown by the evidence presented to be incompetent. 12
The law protects an individual's right to accept or reject medical treat
ment, whether that decision is wise or unwise. 13 As set forth in the
Saikewicz decision, once a determination of incompetency has been
made, the role of the court is to substitute itself as nearly as possible
for the incompetent person and to act on the same motives and consid
erations as would move the incompetent person. The court's role as
substitute decisionmaker is subjective in nature-that is, the goal is to
determine with as much accuracy as possible the wants and needs of
the individual involved. This mayor may not conform to what is
thought wise or prudent by most people. The problems of arriving at
an accurate substituted judgment in matters of life and death vary
greatly in degree, if not in kind, in different circumstances. 14
The Saikewicz court, in essence, forced conversation between the
physician and the trial court about the incompetent's medical and
nonmedical wants and needs. In doing so, the court established a for
malized variant of Professor Katz's goal of self-reflective conversation
7.

Id. at 738-39, 744-45, 370 N.E.2d at 424, 427.
Id. at 745, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
9. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 2 (West Supp. 1986).
10. Id. at § 6.
11. Id. at § 6A.
12. Id. at §§ 6 & 6A.
13. Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978).
14. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz. 373 Mass. 728, 750-51,
370 N.E.2d 417, 430 (1977).
8.
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between doctor and patient. Both models are designed to eradicate a
silent relationship between doctor and patient. Professor Katz pro
poses a decisionmaking process in which the parties concentrate on
conscious and unconscious values affecting their positions on treat
ment, with hope leading both to recognize previously unspoken bases
for the final decision (pp. iii-4, 150-55). Professor Katz's model ad
dresses a silent world in which one party dominates and refuses to
communicate to the other; the Saikewicz court addresses a silent world
in which the parties cannot communicate with each other because of
one's disability.
The supreme judicial court has established a process which seeks
information similar to that Professor Katz wished to realize in his own
model: the trial court and the doctor attempt to discover how the
incompetent person would view the treatment options, with the court
deciding which facts are important and using them to make a final
decision. The Saikewicz court also demonstrated the same respect as
Katz does for the sanctity of the patient's final decision, whether or
not the decision seems reasonable to doctors or other similarly situated
patients. As Professor Katz stated, "Although [respecting patients'
ultimate decisions] may mean bowing at times to 'foolish' choices,
they must be honored to protect the process of thinking about
choices. . ." (p. 154). Katz and the Saikewicz court seem to agree
that preserving a patient's right to self-determination begins with pro
tection of the method through which the patient's wishes and needs
are best expressed, regardless of the outcome.
Respect for the outcome in substituted judgment determinations,
however, is not absolute until the final participant-the state--deter
mines that the incompetent person's interests do not conflict with its
own interests in the decision. The court must balance the individual's
interests against potentially countervailing state interests, which have
been defined as "(1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection of the
interests of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4)
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession."15 In
Saikewicz, the supreme judicial court found no state interest or combi
nation of interests sufficient to override the patient's decision, as deter
mined by the trial court, to decline life-prolonging treatment. 16

c. Cases Following Saikewicz
At this juncture, it is appropriate to underscore two related com
15. Id. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
16. Id. at 744·45, 370 N.E.2d at 427.

1987]

MEDICAL DECISIONMAKING FOR INCOMPETENT PERSONS

157

ments made by the supreme judicial court in cases following
Saikewicz. First, a substituted judgment decision is distinct from a
decision by doctors as to what is medically in the "best interests" of
the patient.J7 Secondly, medical advice and opinion are to be used for
the same purposes and to the same extent that the incompetent indi
vidual would, if he or she were competent. IS These comments and the
Saikewicz decision clarify the respective roles of the trial judge and the
treating physician. The judge is to probe the individual's values and
preferences, while the physician is to present and explain treatment
options. As Professor Katz commented,
no single right decision exists for how the life of health and illness
should be lived. Medical advances have led to a proliferation of
treatment options and a better understanding of their benefits and
risks. Alleviation of suffering can be accomplished in a variety of
ways and alternative choices must be explained. Physicians alone
cannot decide which treatment is best. The patient must be con
sulted (p. 102).

In cases of extraordinary medical treatment for incompetent persons,

the court, in effect, stands in the place of the patient for the purpose of
considering medical advice and opinion. Beyond this, the court must
balance the patient's individual interests against potentially counter
vailing state interests.
From the authors' point of view, the role of the physician is
neither diminished nor reduced in this process-unless one perceives
such role as including ultimate decisionmaking responsibility for in
competent persons. In the case of Rogers v. Commissioner of Depart
ment of Mental Health,19 the psychiatric profession argued that if a
substituted judgment is to be required before there can be forcible ad
ministration of antipsychotic medication to involuntarily confined, in
competent patients, the decision as to substituted judgment should be
made by a physician and not a judge. The supreme judicial court re
jected this procedure, the so-called medical model, citing, among other
things, the likelihood of conflicting interests on the part of physicians.
Doctors, according to the opinion, are not only attempting to treat
psychiatric patients but also to maintain institutional order. Thus,
"the temptation to engage in blanket prescription of such drugs to
maintain order and compensate for personnel shortages may be irresis
17. In re Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 435, 421 N.E.2d 40,52 (1981).
18. Id. at 435, 421 N.E.2d at 52; Rogers v. Comm'r of Dept. of Mental Health, 390
Mass. 489, 500, 458 N.E.2d 308, 317 (1983).
19. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 502, 458 N.E.2d at 317.
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tible. "20 As Professor Katz comments, "The idea that doctors know
what is in their patients' interest and therefore can act on their behalf
without inquiry is so patently untrue that one can only marvel at the
fervor with which the notion has been defended (p. 98). The supreme
judicial court has repeatedly rejected any delegation of decisionmaking
responsibility away from the court in extraordinary treatment
situations. 21
In the aftermath of Saikewicz, there have been a number of cases
involving life-prolonging treatment issues. The supreme judicial court
and appeals court consistently have applied the substituted judgment
doctrine on behalf of mentally incompetent persons or minor chil
dren. 22 The supreme judicial court and appeals court have also ex
tended the substituted judgment doctrine and judicial decisionmaking
responsibility to other areas of extraordinary medical care and treat
ment, including sterilization,23 antipsychotic medication,24 and artifi
cial maintenance of nutrition and hydration. 25 In dicta,
Massachusetts courts have also included electroconvulsive therapy
and psychosurgery. 26
Thus far, courts have defined extraordinary medical treatment on
a case-by-case basis. In In re Spring, the supreme judicial court sug
gested a number of factors to be considered in determining whether a
prior court order is needed with respect to medical treatment for in
competent patients. 27
20. Id. at 504 n.19, 458 N.E.2d at 318 n.19.
21. See infra notes 22-25.
22. Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978) (order continuing
chemotherapy for minor child over parental objection); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405
N.E.2d 115 (1980) (order withholding hemodialysis from incompetent person); Custody of
a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982) (approval of "no-code" order for minor
child with serious cardiac problems); In re Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959
(1984) (order withholding surgical procedure necessary to provide ward with adequate nu
trition support).
In Comm'r of Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979), the court
ordered hemodialysis for a competent individual who was refusing treatment. The critical
factor in this case was the patient's status as a prison inmate and the state's overriding
interest in upholding orderly prison administration.
23. In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982).
24. Rogers v. Comm'r of Dept. of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308
(1983); In re Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
25. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626
(1986).
26. Roe, 383 Mass. at 437, 421 N.E.2d at 53.
27. These factors include the following:
the extent of impairment of the patient's mental faculties; whether the patient is
in the custody of a State institution; the prognosis without the proposed treat
ment; the prognosis with the proposed treatment; the complexity, risk, and nov
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THE JUDGE'S ROLE

In The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, Professor Katz com
mented on the tendency of patients to defer to doctors with "unques
tioning compliance, unilateral trust, and verbal silence" (p. 100).
There is a similar tendency on the part of trial judges, when con
fronted with a substituted judgment determination, to question their
roles in making such a decision. A not infrequent comment on the part
of judges is, "I'm not a doctor. I have no business making a medical
decision." This perspective misses the critical point that. the trial
judge's role is to stand in place of the ward and attempt to ascertain
the incompetent person's actual values and preferences. The condi
tioned response of deferring to the authority of physicians is perhaps
best illustrated by the following dialogue excerpted from the trial tran
script in Saikewicz. Admittedly, the trial court judge was presiding
over what was at that time a . novel and rather extraordinary
proceeding.
THE COURT: There is evidence that chemotherapy treatment is
apparently the only treatment, but by giving it to him he may have
some discomfiture at the time of the treatment that may prolong his
life.
DR. DAVIS: That is one thing and if they don't give it to him at
all, then he may die in a matter of days or weeks.
THE COURT: That is the choice I have to make.
DR. DAVIS: That is it. I don't know. I don't have that deep
knowledge.
THE COURT: I am inclined to give treatment.
DR. JONES: One thing that concerns me is the question about his
ability to cooperate. I think it's been made clear that he doesn't
have the capability to understand the treatment and he mayor may
not be cooperative, therefore greatly complicating the treatment
process.... That has to be weighed, whether [the treatment] could
be administered.
THE COURT: Dr. Davis, do you agree?
DR. DAVIS: I think it's going to be virtually impossible to carry
out the treatment in the proper way without having problems. You
have to see him. When you approach him in the hospital, he flails
elty of the proposed treatment; its possible side effects; the patient's level of
understanding and probable reaction; the urgency of decision; the consent of the
patient, spouse, or guardian; the good faith of those who participate in the deci
sion; the clarity of professional opinion as to what is good medical practice; the
interests of third persons; and the administrative requirements of any institution
involved.
In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 636-37, 405 N.E.2d lIS, 121 (1980).
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at you and there is no way of communicating with him and he is
quite strong; so he will have to be restrained and that increases the
chances of pneumonia, to restrain him if he can't be up and around.
MR. MELNICK [Court-appointed guardian for Saikewicz, who
concurred in the physicians' determination to withhold treatment]:
With no treatment he may live longer; with treatment, the treat
ment itself may terminate his life sooner. There is some risk be
cause of the toxic nature of the treatment, so in effect, by ordering
the treatment there is a possibility that you may shorten his life and
there is a chance that you may be prolonging it.
THE COURT: Maybe I should change my judgment.
DR. DAVIS: One other factor. Though we will get a remission, we
are not through at that point. He'd have to be under medical care
weekly and continue treatment and he may be in the hospital for
four to five weeks initially and will have to be coming back on a
regular basis. That enters the picture.

****
THE COURT: Do I have to form a written judgment?
MR. ROGERS: Yes, I will draft it.
THE COURT: After a full hearing with medical specialists and
doctors being present and their testimony being taken, the Court
determines and adjudges that chemotherapy treatment should not
be given at this time. 28

The Saikewicz line of decisions now provides both guidance and
instruction for the trial court judge. For example, in the Roe opinion,
the supreme judicial court identified six factors to be considered by the
judge in making a substituted judgment determination. These include:
"(1) the ward's expressed preferences regarding treatment; (2) his reli
gious beliefs; (3) the impact upon the ward's family; (4) the probability
of adverse side effects; (5) the consequences if treatment is refused; and
(6) the prognosis with treatment."29 This criteria is not exclusive, but
rather provides a basic framework for the judge's inquiry. The Roe
decision also states, "In this search, procedural intricacies and techni
cal niceties must yield to the need to know the actual values and pref
erences of the ward."30
In the Moe decision, the supreme judicial court developed de
tailed and specialized criteria for the trial court judge to apply in ster
ilization cases. 3I The supreme judicial court stressed that the judge
28.

R.

BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PA

155-57 (1979).
29. Roe, 383 Mass. at 444, 421 N.E.2d at 57.
30. Id.
31. Moe, 385 Mass. at 567-70,432 N.E.2d at 721-22.

TIENT RELATIONS
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must exercise the utmost care in reviewing all of the evidence
presented. "The judge must enter detailed written findings indicating
those persuasive factors that determine the outcome. We are per
suaded that a conscientious judge . . . will give serious and heedful
attention to all stages of the proceeding."32
In Saikewicz, the supreme judicial court indicated that the trial
judge may, at any stage in the proceedings, "avail himself or herself of
the additional advice or knowledge of any person or group," including
medical experts or medical ethics committees or panels. 33 Although
such information may be considered by the court whenever available
and useful, the judge may not delegate to any individual or group the
ultimate decisionmaking responsibility. According to the supreme ju
dicial court, "such questions . . . seem to us to require the process of
detached but passionate investigation and decision that forms the ideal
on which the judicial branch of government was created."34

III.

THE ApPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN AD LITEM
AND/OR COUNSEL

To assist further the trial judge, the supreme judicial court has
indicated that a guardian ad litem should be appointed to represent
the interests of the proposed ward. 35 At a minimum, the guardian ad
litem must ensure that all viewpoints and alternatives to the relief re
quested are presented to the court. 36 In addition, there apparently has
been some continuing confusion regarding the guardian ad litem role,
specifically, whether the guardian ad litem is to conduct an independ
ent investigation for the court or to act as counsel for the ward. Fol
lowing the Rogers decision, the Probate and Family Court
Department issued procedures which call for the appointment of
counsel in all antipsychotic medication cases. 37 The appointment of a
guardian ad litem remains discretionary with the court. The proce
dures clarify the respective roles of counsel and guardian ad litem,
with counsel representing the proposed ward and acting as his or her
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 572, 432 N.E.2d at 724.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 757-58, 370 N.E.2d at 434.
Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435.
Id. at 757, 370 N.E.2d at 433.
Id.

37. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, PROBATE AND FAMILY COURT DEPARTMENT,
OUTLINE OF PROCEDURES FOR CASES BROUGHT PURSUANT TO ROGERS v. COMM'R. OF
MENTAL HEALTH (1984). The Office issued these procedures on May 10, 1984, and they
are available at each Massachusetts Registry of Probate.
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advocate, and the guardian ad litem serving as an independent investi
gator for the court.
IV.

THE ADVERSARIAL NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

The authors have received comments from both physicians and
counsel for the Commonwealth to the effect that the appointment of
counsel renders these proceedings unnecessarily adversarial. 38 From
our perspective, however, effective assistance of counsel serves only to
protect the important interests of the ward. At a minimum, counsel
for the ward can ensure that the court has before it a complete picture
of the case. For example, upon cross-examination of the treating phy
sician, counsel can probe alternatives to the recommended treatment
or pose questions regarding the patient's alleged incompetency. The
use of independent medical experts can also prove invaluable in this
regard. 39 For the treating physician, the only discomfort may be some
very direct questioning regarding his or her evaluation and recom
mended treatment. The reality is that most physicians have very legit
imate reasons for their treatment recommendations, and the
substituted judgment doctrine does no more than require them to ar
ticulate such reasons. This is the judicial version of "respectful con
versation" with the physician. In addition, physicians are not the only
witnesses in these proceedings. Family members may testify as to their
involvement with the patient and their position regarding treatment.
Frequently, the patient will take the witness stand and articulate his or
her preference regarding recommended treatment. Additional wit
nesses might include psychologists, social workers, or laypersons who
have direct involvement with the patient. Although most of the ques
tioning is conducted by respective counsel, the trial judge, as substitute
decisionmaker, should not hesitate to question any or all of the wit
nesses, particularly if there is a need for additional information regard
ing the substituted judgment criteria or clarification or elaboration of
previous testimony .
.V.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS MODEL

A further criticism of the Massachusetts substituted judgment
38. The authors have handled over two hundred antipsychotic medication cases and
numerous other cases involving a variety of extraordinary medical treatment issues.
39. In Guardianship of a Mentally III Person with the Authority to Administer An
tipsychotic Medication, No. 85-0018 Civ. (Mass. App. Ct. 1985), the Massachusetts Ap
peals Court held that an indigent patient in a Rogers guardianship proceeding is entitled to
the assistance of a medical expert at the Commonwealth's expense.
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model, voiced by both doctors and lawyers, is that the requirement of
prior judicial approval has created an extremely cumbersome pro
cess.40 Admittedly, many medical decisions must be made on an ur
gent or at least expedited basis. The supreme judicial court addressed
this issue in several of its decisions following Saikewicz.
To begin with, physicians may act in emergency situations. In
Roe, the supreme judicial court accepted the diCtionary definition of
emergency, i. e., "an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the
resulting state that calls for immediate action."41 The supreme judi
cial court, however, added an important qualification:
We ... emphasize that in determining whether an emergency exists
in terms of requiring 'immediate action,' the relevant time period to
be examined begins when the claimed emergency arises, and ends
when the individual who seeks to act in the emergency could, with
reasonable diligence, obtain judicial review of his proposed actions.
This time period will, of course, be brief. . . .42

In Rogers, the supreme judicial court pointed to the Common
wealth's statutory and regulatory scheme regarding the use of antip
sychotiC medications as chemical restraints in emergency situations.
The Rogers opinion also allowed forcible treatment with antipsychotic
mediCation of incompetent persons to prevent the "immediate, sub
stantial, and irreversible deterioration of a serious mental illness."43
Reading Roe and Rogers together, it is our view that although
physicians may act in emergencies, they are not relieved from proceed
ing to court if extraordinary medical treatment is to be rendered on an
ongoing basis.
The supreme judicial court has stressed that expedited procedures
exist on the trial court level to handle urgent medical cases. 44 Massa
chusetts General Law, chapter 201 and Rule 29B of the Probate
Courts provide for the appointment of a temporary guardian by a pro
bate judge. 45 The Massachusetts trial court has also developed the
Judicial Response System, which makes judges available after normal
40.
(1978).
41.
42.
43.
308, 322
44.
45.
(1987).

See, e.g., Curran, The Saikewicz Decision, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 499, 500
In re Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 440, 421 N.E.2d 40, 54 (1981).
Id. at 441, 421 N.E.2d at 55.
Rogers v. Comm'r of Dept. of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 511, 458 N.E.2d
(1983).
In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 642, 405 N.E.2d 115, 123 (1980).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201 (West Supp. 1986); Mass. P. Ct. R. § 29B
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working hours and on weekends and holidays.46 Thus, judges are ac
cessible around the clock to handle urgent medical matters.
VI.

JUDICIAL AND MEDICAL RESOURCES

Following the Rogers decision, the Department of Mental Health
estimated that several thousand cases would be filed seeking judicial
authorization to administer antipsychotic medication to mentally ill
and mentally retarded persons in the Department's care. 47 A number
of the divisions of the Probate and Family Court Department are now
experiencing difficulty handling the sheer volume of cases. With the
passage of recent legislation, the District Court Department has also
begun to hear Rogers-type cases. 48 In the authors' view, it is impera
tive that the Chief Administrative Justice of the Trial Court, along
with the Chief Justices of the District Court and Probate and Family
Court Departments, allocate additional resources to those divisions of
the trial court which presently are facing particularly heavy case loads.
These resources should include, at a minimum, the assignment of ad
ditional judges and support staff and the allocation of funds to provide
monitoring of court-ordered treatment. The monitoring of treatment
by guardians, if available, or by the court itself is an essential aspect of
the Rogers decision. 49 Consideration also should be given to schedul
ing special sessions or appointing masters for the purposes of handling
antipsychotic medication cases. In the absence of adequate judicial
resources, it will be impossible to comply with the requirements of
Rogers.
Professor Katz mentioned the economic arguments raised by
physicians, admitting that "greater fidelity to disclosure and consent
will be costly both in physicians' time and patients' fees" (p. 201). In
cases involving extraordinary medical care for incompetent patients,
the resource commitment on the part of physicians is a very legitimate
concern, particularly as the judicial hearings may require the appear
ance and testimony of physicians. Some doctors, however, have opted
to simply avoid the court process altogether. 50 There is reportedly
widespread noncompliance with the Rogers decision on the part of
46. Information regarding the Judicial Response System may be obtained from the
respective Registries of Probate.
47. R. Ames, Rogers-Implications for Administration of Antipsychotic Medication
(Dec. 16, 1983) (Massachusetts Department of Mental Health memorandum).
48. 1985 Mass. Acts 344.
49. Rogers, 380 Mass. at 504 n.20, 458 N.E.2d at 318 n.20.
50. Interview with Jeffrey MacKenzie, Esq., Massachusetts Department of Mental
Health Legal Office, in Northampton, Massachusetts (January 21, 1986).
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physicians in both the community and institutional settings. 51 Thus,
many incompetent mentally ill and mentally retarded persons are be
ing treated with antipsychotic medication without the benefit of a sub
stituted judgment determination. Such practice not only violates the
legal rights of mentally disabled persons, but also may import severe
consequences for treating physicians. In Harnish v. Children's Hospi
tal Medical Center,52 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
adopted, for the first time, the doctrine of informed consent. The
opinion stated in relevant part, that "a physician's failure to divulge in
a reasonable manner to a competent adult patient sufficient informa
tion to enable the patient to make an informed judgment whether to
give or withhold consent to a medical or surgical procedure constitutes
professional [medical] misconduct.... "53 In our view, a physician's
failure to obtain the court's "informed consent" by way of a substi
tuted judgment before rendering extraordinary medical treatment to
an incompetent person constitutes similar medical misconduct, and
may result in the initiation of malpractice litigation.
Compliance with the law is only one issue, however, and those
doctors unwilling to adhere to the Saikewicz line of decisions are pre
sumably aware that they may be sanctioned. Apart from this, we sug
gest that representatives from both the medical and legal professions
begin to explore together existing resource problems and perhaps con
sider whether legislative action in the form of revisions or amendments
to the law is, in fact, desired.

VII.

THE BROPHY DECISION

Recently, the supreme judicial court issued its opinion in the con
troversial and highly-publicized case of Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hospital, Inc. 54 The Brophy decision is a further example of the appli
cation of the Massachusetts substituted judgment model. In this case,
the supreme judicial court decided that food and water may be with
held from a patient who is in a persistent vegetative state but not ter
minally ill. 55 The court's balancing of Mr. Brophy's individual
interests and preferences against specifically identified state interests is
worth reviewing in some detail.
At the trial court in Brophy, the presiding judge found that if Mr.
51.

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
387 Mass. 152,439 N.E.2d 240 (1982).
Id. at 154-55,439 N.E.2d at 242.
398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
Id. at 441, 497 N.E.2d at 639.
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Brophy were competent, his choice would be to forego the provision of
food and water and thereby terminate his life. 56 Despite this finding,
the trial court concluded that the state's interest in the preservation of
life outweighed Mr. Brophy's individual interest and preference to de
cline treatment. 57 The trial court also concluded that it would be
"ethically inappropriate to cause the preventable death of Brophy by
the deliberate denial of food and water, which can be provided to him
in a noninvasive, nonintrusive manner which causes no pain and
suffering...."58
In reversing the trial court decision, the supreme judicial court
balanced Mr. Brophy's substituted judgment to reject treatment
against three potentially countervailing state interests: (1) the preser
vation of life, (2) the prevention of suicide, and (3) the maintenance of
the ethical integrity of the medical profession. 59 Regarding the state's
interest in the preservation of life, the supreme judicial court indicated
that "the State's interest in life encompasses a broader interest than
mere corporeal existence. In certain, thankfully rare, circumstances
the burden of maintaining the corporeal existence degrades the very
humanity it was meant to serve. The law recognizes the individual's
right to preserve his humanity, even if to preserve his humanity means
to allow the natural processes of a disease or affliction to bring about a
death with dignity."60 Thus, the supreme judicial court concluded
that the state's interest in the preservation of life did not overcome
Brophy's right to discontinue treatment. 61
The supreme judicial court also rejected the state's interest in the
prevention of suicide as an applicable consideration. 62 The court
noted "[a] death which occurs after the removal of life sustaining sys
tems is from natural causes, neither set in motion nor intended by the
patient."63
Finally, regarding the ethical integrity of the medical profession,
the supreme judicial court concluded that as long as the defendant
hospital was not forced to withhold food and water from the patient,
56. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., No. 85EOOO9GI (Norfolk Division,
Probate and Family Court Department, Oct. 21, 1985).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 42.
59. See infra notes 60-64.
60. Brophy, 398 Mass. at 434, 497 N.E.2d at 635.
61. Id. at 439, 497 N.E.2d at 638.
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting Rasmussen v. Flemming, No.2 CA-CIV 5622, slip op. at 11-12
(Ariz. Ct. App. June 25, 1986) (quoting In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114,660 P.2d 738, 743
(1983»).
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the integrity of the medical profession is not violated. 64 The supreme
judicial court noted that there is substantial disagreement in the medi
cal community over the appropriate medical action. 65 The supreme
judicial court remanded the case to the trial court for a new judgment
to be entered ordering the hospital to assist the guardian in transfer
ring the patient to a different facility or to his home where the patient's
wishes could be effectuated. 66
CONCLUSION

Professor Katz urges that, "[a]bove all, physicians and patients
must learn to converse with one another" (p. xxi). In cases of ex
traordinary medical treatment for incompetent persons, Massachu
setts has created a judicial model which, in effect, forces conversation
between the physician and trial court regarding a patient's medical
needs and individual preferences. We have described, in part, the crite
ria and mechanics of the Massachusetts model, as defined by the
supreme judicial court and appeals court, and some of the practical
problems involved with the model, such as inadequate judicial and
medical resources. In so doing, it is our hope that judges, lawyers, and
doctors can understand and cooperate better in this important deci
sionmaking process. Throughout the article, we have tried to convey
what we consider to be the fundamental principle underlying the Mas
sachusetts substituted judgment model-that of individual autonomy
and the "emphasis away from a paternalistic view of what is 'best' for
a patient toward a reaffirmation that the basic question is what deci
sion will comport with the will of the person involved. . . ."67 As
participants in this symposium, we have been fascinated by the numer
ous parallels between Professor Katz's thesis and many of the basic
tenets expressed in the Saikewicz line of decisions.

64.
65.
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439-41, 497 N.E.2d at 638-39.
440 0.38, 497 N.E.2d at 638-39 0.38.
441, 442, 497 N.E.2d at 639-40.
431, 497 N.E.2d at 633.

